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Self-Evaluative  Privilege 
Thomas E. Powell 
Institute of  Internal Auditors, Inc. 
As the Director of  Professional  Practices with the Institute of  Internal 
Auditors (IIA), I respond to many, and duck some, questions from  practitioners 
and others regarding all manner of  issues with which practitioners are confront-
ed daily. In recent years one question seems to be asked more frequently.  The 
question is: 
How can we protect our workpapers and reports from  access by parties 
other than those for  whom they were prepared? 
External auditors are familiar  with both protecting their workpapers from 
access and having their reports used by third parties. Auditing students learn 
early that Ultramares  v. Touche  & Co. [1931] means third parties need to be 
carefully  considered in the audit process. Internal auditors usually aren't con-
cerned about that sort of  thing. After  all, their work is only for  the use of  their 
organization and they are a part of  that organization. Or are they? 
How Internal Auditors See Themselves 
Internal auditing is defined  in the Statement  of  Responsibilities  of  Internal 
Auditing [IIA, 1990] as follows: 
Internal Auditing is an independent appraisal function  established within 
an organization to examine and evaluate its activities as a service to the 
organization. The objective is to assist members of  the organization in the 
effective  discharge of  their responsibilities. To this end, internal auditing 
furnishes  them with analyses, appraisals, recommendations, counsel, and 
information  concerning the activities reviewed.1 
It is this position that allows an internal auditor to use his or her detailed 
knowledge of  the entity's policies, procedures, and environment to appraise the 
function  and apprise management of  existing or potential problem areas. 
In earlier versions of  the Statement  of  Responsibilities of  Internal  Auditing 
[1947, 1957, 1971, 1976] the wording was more narrow and implied a stronger 
allegiance to management: "Internal Auditing is an independent appraisal activ-
ity within an organization for  the review of  operations as a service to manage-
ment." 
In 1981 and subsequent versions "service to management" was changed to 
"service to the organization." This new broad allegiance provides a professional 
basis for  departing from  the interest of  management. It also provides a basis for 
1 The Institute of  Internal Auditors, Inc., Statement of  Responsibilities of  Internal Auditing 
(Altamonte Springs, Florida: The Institute of  Internal Auditors, Inc., 1990). 
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others to view the internal auditor's work product as fertile  ground for 
homing in on the organization's problem areas as identified  by an objective 
professional. 
How External Auditors See Internal Auditors 
Last year the Auditing Standards Board of  the AICPA wrapped up a two-
year project to update Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) Number 9: The 
Effect  of  an Internal  Audit  Function  on the Scope of  the Independent  Audit.  SAS 
Number 65: The  Auditor's  Consideration  of  the Internal  Audit  Function  in an 
Audit  of  Financial  Statements  superseded SAS 9. 
One of  the most hotly debated topics was the concept of  internal auditor 
independence. It was finally  decided to point out in SAS 65 that the two profes-
sions define  independence differently. 2 Rather than concentrate on indepen-
dence, externa] auditors are directed in SAS 65 to look at the internal auditor's 
objectivity and competence, among other things. Based on their assessment they 
can then determine the degree to which the work of  internal auditors might be 
used to supplement or reduce some of  their own work. 
Although this professional  recognition was more subtle than some internal 
auditors would have desired, it was viewed very positively by others. However, 
the point was made once again that internal audit workpapers have a broader 
audience than the entity's management. This recognition is a continuation of  the 
changes that have occurred primarily in the last twenty years. 
Recent Changes 
The stature of  internal auditors has changed dramatically in the last two 
decades. One milestone was the establishment of  the CIA Program.3 Although 
not a license, the CIA credential has afforded  a means of  recognizing those 
internal auditors who have attained professional  status through education, expe-
rience and examination. As internal auditors were working on improving their 
own abilities to provide professional  service, legislation was being forged  to 
increase the demand for  such service. The passage of  the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act in 1977 was another visible milestone in the profession.  Since that 
time the increased expectations of  the profession  are obvious. 
Internally, the work product of  internal auditors has always been viewed by 
management as one of  the best sources of  independent appraisal within an orga-
nization. In 1987, the Treadway Commission [Report  of  the National 
Commission on Fraudulent  Financial  Reporting,  1987] underscored that view 
and encouraged an internal audit function  as a means of  strengthening corporate 
integrity. 
In the United States the issue of  corporate integrity obviously has many 
sides. Recently we have had some spectacular examples of  fraud  and misman-
agement which undermined the public's confidence  in everyone and everything 
from  ministers to gambling casinos. Individuals have been damaged and litiga-
tion has inevitably followed.  In this climate people do search for  someone to 
blame when things go wrong. Sometimes the search is eleemosynary and some-
2 SAS 65 defined  independence for  external auditors and indicated in a footnote  that IIA Standards 
use the term differently. 
3 The Certified  Internal Auditor Program requires completion of:  a two-day, four-part  written exam-
ination: two years of  qualifying  experience; and, a degree which equates to the U.S. baccalaureate 
degree. The exam is offered  in French, English and Spanish at sites around the world. 
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times it's for  profit.  One of  the places that people found  to search was internal 
auditors' workpapers. Being popular is not something internal auditors are used 
to, so it is understandable that they are uncomfortable  when unforeseen  third-
party clients suddenly appear. 
A Call For Help 
The call I receive is frequently  from  a director of  internal auditing or a mem-
ber of  an organization's legal staff,  either anticipating or responding to work-
product access by third parties. Unfortunately  the question usually doesn't come 
up until the circumstances have progressed too far  for  the organization to deal 
effectively  with the situation. I usually ask a few  questions to see if  the situation 
is similar to any of  the ones I have heard before.  But it seems that there are 
enough differences  to make a general answer difficult. 
Sometimes the access is sought by a local, state, or federal  regulatory author-
ity. Typically the caller says: "We are not concerned about the issues they are 
raising but our workpapers contain a lot of  other unrelated subjective data that 
we don't want them to see." The caller sometimes asks: "How will I avoid 
scope restrictions when word gets out that my workpapers are an open book? I 
am trying to help my company correct and avoid problems, not punish them." 
I usually share some basic information  and references  starting with the 
Codification  Of  Standards  for  the Professional  Practice of  Internal  Auditing. 
The Standards  state that "Audit working papers are the property of  the organi-
zation." Furthermore they warn that "there are circumstances where requests for 
access to audit working papers and reports are made by parties outside the orga-
nization other than the external auditor. Prior to releasing such documentation, 
the director of  internal auditing should obtain the approval of  senior manage-
ment and/or legal counsel."4 
Based on my own experience it appears that most organizations have not 
anticipated these outside requests. They do not document internal memos and 
reports anticipating external publication. Since the main purpose of  these 
reports is to get action, the wording is usually devoid of  all of  the caveats 
designed to avoid liability or shift  blame. My caller is usually playing catch up 
and needs help immediately. So I, at this point, am forced  to suggest that they 
balance their check book, unless they have privileges similar to U.S. congress-
men, and call an attorney. 
These calls started coming so regularly that I called our own attorney and 
asked for  some sort of  informational  memo that I could share with our mem-
bers. I also suggested to our Professional  Issues Committee that they draft  a 
position paper that would give further  guidance to all internal auditors who 
were faced  with access issues. 
The question is a difficult  one because there are good arguments on every 
side except the one I usually happen to be defending.  The Professional  Issues 
Committee did prepare an advisory report5 in an attempt to be responsive to the 
4 The Institute of  Internal Auditors, Inc., Codification  of  Standards For The Professional  Practice of 
Internal Auditing: No. 420 (Altamonte Springs, Florida: The Institute of  Internal Auditors, Inc., 
1989). 
5 The Professional  Issues Committee of  the IIA, just released a subcommittee report which provides 
guidance including a sample access policy statement for  use by organizations in preparing for 
access requests. 
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problem. In the report they identified  the basic concerns. The issues they 
defined  go to the heart of  our profession: 
• Independence. 
• Objectivity. 
• The right of  the public to know versus the right of  an individual or an 
organization to privacy. 
• The constitutional protection from  self-incrimination. 
• Whether the public interests are best served by openness or by confi-
dentiality. 
• The role of  the internal auditor serving management as well as the 
board of  directors in the private sector, and the role of  the internal 
auditor as a public servant in the governmental sector. 
The committee's report points out that in order to be effective  as an indepen-
dent appraisal function,  internal auditing must be able to objectively evaluate 
high-risk activities and frankly  communicate the results to management and the 
board. Unlimited access to internal auditing work-products by outside parties 
would have a chilling effect  both on the scope of  activities reviewed and the 
frankness  with which results were communicated. 
If  this sounds like a plea for  privileged communication or protection from 
self-incrimination,  many would argue that it should be that way. But others 
might say that most organizations being called to report are simply too big and 
too public to demand privacy. 
The Internal Auditor's Code 
The Code  of  Ethics  of  the Institute of  Internal Auditors, Inc., states in Article 
VIII [IIA, 1988]: 
Members and CIAs shall be prudent in the use of  information  acquired in 
the course of  their duties. They shall not use confidential  information  for 
any personal gain nor in any manner which would be contrary to law or 
detrimental to the welfare  of  their organization. 
Article II states [IIA, 1988]: 
Members and CIAs shall exhibit loyalty in all matters pertaining to the 
affairs  of  their organization or to whomever they may be rendering a ser-
vice. However, Members and CIAs shall not knowingly be a party to any 
illegal or improper activity. 
Now when the interests of  owners, managers, regulators, and other interested 
parties are the same there is no problem. When those interests diverge, whose 
interests come first?  The Board of  Directors? Owners (members)? The public? 
Regulators? The auditor? 
Self-Evaluative  Privilege 
I mentioned earlier that I asked our attorneys to outline this concept of  the 
"self-evaluative  privilege." Our attorney provided me with the following  memo-
randum dated March 1990: 
The self-evaluative  privilege is a judicially recognized doctrine which 
provides that, under certain circumstances, documents created pursuant to 
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a critical self-analysis  by a company should not be subject to compelled 
disclosure in private litigation. The rationale for  the privilege is relatively 
simple: Company self-evaluations  are beneficial,  most immediately to the 
company and ultimately to society, and the fear  of  public disclosure of  the 
results of  self-evaluations  would discourage such efforts.  Unlike some 
privileges recognized by the law (e.g., the attorney-client privilege) the 
self-evaluative  privilege is not well-defined,  nor has it achieved broad 
acceptance. This situation is exacerbated by the fact  that the privilege is 
currently being formulated  almost exclusively by trial court judges, not 
appellate courts, and this leads to inconsistent application of  the 
privilege.6 
A few  courts have subscribed to the self-evaluative  privilege, including 
Bredice  v. Doctors Hospital  Inc.,  50 F.R.D. 249 [D.D.C., 1970], affirmed  479 
F. 2d 920 [D.C.Cir., 1973], The  Washington  Post Co. v. U.S.  Department  of 
Justice,  No. 84-3581 [D.D.C., Sept 25, 1987], and Federal  Trade  Commission 
v. TRW,  Inc.,  628 F. 2d 207 [D.D.C., 1980], However as pointed out in the 
above memo, this is not uniformly  recognized. 
Internal auditors have battled the reputation of  being an adversary rather than 
an ally of  management. If  the internal auditors' workpapers become regularly 
accessed by true adversaries, the auditors may have more difficulty  locating 
problem areas for  early detection and correction. 
In an unofficial  IIA informational  publication, the legal issues faced  by inter-
nal auditors were explored and auditors were warned that [Fargason, 1992, p. 
27]: 
Workpapers can be exposed during any legal proceeding, including inter-
rogatories, motions/request for  documents, depositions, subpoenas, etc. 
Internal auditors should be aware of  the fact  that their reports and work-
papers may be the foundation  for  a lawsuit. 
Unless internal workpapers can be protected by either the attorney-client privi-
lege or the work-product privilege, they are likely to be discoverable [Fargason, 
1992, p. 28]. 
This is not always the case. In United  States  v. Newport  News  Shipbuilding 
and  Dry Dock Company, CA 4 No. 87-3832 (Newport News I) the Fourth 
Circuit Court of  Appeals affirmed  the district court's order denying the enforce-
ment of  a DCAA subpoena for  internal auditing work-products. In this case, the 
workpapers contained data that was not "closely connected." 
Some of  the calls I receive suggest that they are being placed under the direc-
tion of  the legal department for  certain investigations in order to come under the 
umbrella of  "attorney-client" privilege. Is this in the best interest of  the profes-
sion? 
An example of  this type of  posture is described in a forthcoming  book from 
the IIA written by James Fargason. "In Pritchard-Keang  Nam  Corporation  v. 
Jaworski,  751 F. 2d 277 (8th Cir. 1984) the issue before  the court was whether 
the attorney-client privilege should be applied to documentation prepared by an 
attorney for  the audit committee of  the corporation. International Systems and 
6 Internal memorandum to The Institute of  Internal Auditors from  the law firm  of  Webster, 
Chamberlain & Bean, (Washington, D.C., March 1990). 
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Controls Corporation (ISC) directed its audit committee to investigate allega-
tions that individuals within the corporation were paying bribes to government 
officials  of  foreign  countries. In order to facilitate  the investigation, the audit 
committee hired an outside accounting firm  and an outside law firm.  The law 
firm  completed its assigned investigation and issued a report to the audit com-
mittee for  review." Fargason [1992, p. 30] points out that the court upheld the 
attorney-client privilege. The court pointed out that not privileging this informa-
tion would have a chilling effect  on individuals who seek legal advice. Clients 
would be less likely to be completely candid and honest with their attorneys. 
Recent U. S. legislation seems to be increasingly directed toward compelling 
internal and external auditors to report problem areas directly to regulators. For 
internal auditors this further  exacerbates an already tenuous hold on their 
desired recognition as "team players" who want to correct existing problems as 
they are found.  But now, internal auditors, having fought  long and hard for 
recognition as objective professionals,  are finding  that "objective" means differ-
ent things to different  people. Internal auditors are supposed to be objective 
advisors, not managers. They cannot usurp management's decision-making 
responsibility. At the point they cross the line and begin to make the decisions 
and direct activity (manage) they are no longer independent of  the activity. 
However, there are others who see that quite differently  and suggest that the 
auditor should be a "whistle-blower." Where the lines between legal and illegal 
are distinct, the answers are clear. But in many complex issues the lines are less 
distinct. 
At the AICPA's Annual Conference  on SEC Developments held January 8, 
1992, attendees were warned to anticipate enforcement  action against internal 
auditors and other in-house officials.  SEC Associate Enforcement  Director 
Bruce Hiler and former  SEC Enforcement  Director Gary Lynch suggested that 
the 1990 Securities Enforcement  Remedies and Penny Stock Act gave the 
Commission broader authority to go after  mid-level executives who "cause" 
violations of  the securities laws either by negligence or by failure  to perform  an 
act. Hiler discussed a 1985 enforcement  action against the controller and trea-
surer of  a company for  aiding the chief  executive officer's  alleged financial 
fraud.  The case is known as the "good soldier" case (SEC  v. Oak Industries  Inc., 
DC SCalif,  6/25/85; 17 SRLR 1199). 
According to Lynch this new legislation allows cease-and-desist orders to be 
used in a way that will make it easier for  the SEC to win its cases. Previously in 
order to get a permanent injunction, the SEC had the burden of  proving in court 
that the defendant  had the propensity to commit the violation again. Lynch 
pointed out that cease-and-desist orders can be handled administratively and do 
not require proof  that violations could recur. 
Another promulgation that professionals  are trying to understand is the new 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines7 which became effective  on November 1, 
1991. These guidelines provide for  restitution, probation, and fines;  with the 
fines  appearing to be the primary instrument of  punishment. Base fines  range 
from  $5,000 for  the lowest offense  to $72,500,000 for  the highest. The base fine 
is then adjusted by minimum and maximum multipliers based on culpability 
7 In May of  1991 the U.S. Sentencing Commission sent to Congress proposed sentencing guidelines 
for  companies convicted of  federal  crimes. These guidelines became law on November 1, 1991. 
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scores. A company with a $72,500,000 fine  could have its fine  reduced to 
$3,600,000 or increased to $290,000,000 based on its culpability score. 
Organizations are encouraged through enormous guideline incentives to 
investigate and report employee misconduct. However, this "voluntary" disclo-
sure may waive any attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine protec-
tion. This in turn opens the organization up to the potential for  civil and admin-
istrative action which may result from  shareholder, competitor, and/or employee 
lawsuits. The documentation for  all of  this may be the internal auditors' work-
papers. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I don't have solutions to offer  but rather challenges to 
researchers, educators, and practitioners alike. Recently I have had the opportu-
nity to work directly with a number of  groups seeking to address reporting 
issues. My observation has been that most of  the time we are in a reactive rather 
than proactive mode. As accounting and auditing professionals  we should be in 
a position to foresee  more of  these problems instead of  dealing with the solu-
tions handed to us by legislators and courts. One of  the basic tenets of  true pro-
fessions  is self-subordination  and a devotion to the welfare  of  those served. 
The legislative efforts  that are increasing our professional  liability have been 
annealed in a crucible of  distrust. We all find  ourselves living in glass houses 
and will have to be ready for  inspection at all times. For auditors that means 
documenting circumspectly. For educators that means teaching critical thinking 
and instilling ethical pride. For researchers that means finding  new solutions to 
keep the professions  in a proactive rather than reactive mode. 
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